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Abstract
In today´s business  world corporate governance has  become one of the 
most discussed and most important matters. Corporate governance 
criteria have been put right in the middle of investment decisions - 
especially in emerging markets. In addition to that, a series of events like 
business scandals, financial crises or business failures in the last 20 years 
has made corporate governance a key point in the business community in 
emerging markets, developing countries and economies in transition.
There exists no general definition for the term corporate governance. 
Basically it can be viewed as a set of principles  and rules by which a 
company is directed and controlled. Many countries have developed good 
corporate governance principles to improve the relationship between the 
shareholders of a company and the management. Factors like financial 
disclosure, more rights for shareholders and independent boards are 
crucial for investors who are looking for a stable growth of companies. 
Countries in the MENA region have put the implementation of such sound 
corporate governance codes in the middle of their agenda. Their aim is  to 
create better economies and consequently a more attractive investment 
climate for possible investors in the future.
This  thesis tries to give the reader an insight into today´s state of 
corporate governance in the Middle East and North Africa countries. The 
discussion is  based on a survey which has been undertaken by the 
Hawkamah Institute for corporate governance in Dubai which focuses on 
the establishment of good corporate governance codes in this region.

Abriss
Das Thema Corporate Governance hat in den vergangenen Jahren 
immens an Wichtigkeit und Bedeutung in der Wirtschaftswelt 
zugenommen. Investitionsentscheidungen werden vermehrt an Corporate 
Governance Kriterien gebunden – besonders in den „emerging markets“. 
Des Weiteren hat die Folge von Wirtschaftsskandalen in den letzten zwei 
Jahrzehnten – man denke an Enron oder Parmalat – dazu geführt, dass 
die Bedeutung von Corporate Governance wieder ins  Bewusstsein der 
Manager und Unternehmungen geraten ist.
Es existiert keine einheitliche Definition für den Begriff Corporate 
Governance. Grundsätzlich kann man es als  ein Bündel von Richtlinien 
und Prinzipien sehen, welche festlegen, wie ein Unternehmen geführt und 
kontrolliert wird. Viele Länder haben gute und effiziente Richtlinien bzw. 
Prinzipien entwickelt, um das Verhältnis  zwischen Aktionären und 
Management zu verbessern. Bereiche wie finanzielle Offenlegung, mehr 
Rechte für Aktionäre und unabhängige Vorstände und Aufsichtsräte sind 
für mögliche Investoren maßgeblich, die ein stabiles Wachstum der 
Firmen wünschen.
Die Länder der MENA Region haben die Durchsetzung bzw. 
Implementierung solcher Corporate Governance Codes in den Mittelpunkt 
ihrer Agenda gestellt. Das Hauptziel ist die Schaffung einer besseren 
Wirtschaft und – daraus resultierend – eines  besseren Investitionsklimas 
für mögliche Investoren für die Zukunft.
Die Absicht dieser Arbeit ist es, dem Leser einen Einblick in den heutigen 
Stand der Corporate Governance Codes bzw. deren Entwicklung im 
mittleren Osten und Nordafrika zu geben. Die Diskussion stützt sich auf 
die Ergebnisse einer Umfrage des renommierten Instituts Hawkamah in 
Dubai, welches sich auf die Durchsetzung solcher Richtlinien und 
Prinzipien in dieser Region spezialisiert hat.

ﺗﻠﺨﻴﺺ
ﻟﻘﺪ ﺃﺻﺒﺤﺖ ﺣﻮﻛﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﺣﺪﺓ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻛﺘﺮ ﺍﳌﻮﺍﺿﻴﻊ ﺍﻫﻤﻴﺔ 
ﻭﻣﻨﺎﻗﺸﺔ, ﻭﻗﺪ ﻭﺿﻌﺖ ﻣﻌﺎﻳﻴﺮ ﺣﻮﻛﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﳊﺴﺒﺎﻥ ﻓﻲ 
ﻗﺮﺍﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻹﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎﺭ ﻭﺑﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻷﺳﻮﺍﻕ ﺍﻟﺼﺎﻋﺪﺓ, ﻭﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ 
ﻓﺎﻥ ﺍﻷﺣﺪﺍﺙ ﺍﳌﺘﻼﺣﻘﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ ﻓﻀﺎﺋﺢ ﺍﻹﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﺍﻭ ﺍﻟﻜﻮﺍﺭﺙ ﺍﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﺍﻭ 
ﺃﻧﻬﻴﺎﺭ ﺍﻻﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺸﺮﻭﻥ ﻋﺎﻣﺎ ﺍﳌﺘﻘﻀﻴﺔ ﺟﻌﻠﺖ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻮﻛﻤﺔ 
ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﻧﻘﻄﺔ ﻣﺤﻮﺭﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﺘﻤﻊ ﺍﻻﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﺳﻮﺍﻕ ﺍﻟﺼﺎﻋﺪﺓ 
ﻭﺍﻟﺪﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻣﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻧﺘﻘﺎﻝ.
 
ﻻ ﻳﺠﺪ ﻣﻔﻬﻤﻮﻡ ﻣﺤﺪﺩ ﳊﻮﻛﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﻭﺑﺼﻔﺔ ﺍﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻓﺎﻧﻪ ﳝﻜﻦ 
ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮﻫﺎ ﺑﺎﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻮﺍﻋﺪ ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺎﺳﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﻰ ﳝﻜﻦ  ﺑﻮﺍﺻﻄﺘﻬﺎ 
ﺗﻮﺟﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻴﻄﺮﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ.
ﻫﻨﺎﻙ ﻋﻮﺍﻣﻞ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺍﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺍﳌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻭﺣﻘﻮﻕ ﺍﻛﺒﺮ ﳊﺎﻣﻠﻰ 
ﺍﻷﺳﻬﻢ ﻭ ﻣﺠﺎﻟﺲ ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﳌﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻌﻮﺍﻣﻞ ﺿﺮﻭﺭﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ 
ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﻋﻦ ﳕﻮ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺮ ﻟﻠﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ.
ﻭﻟﻘﺪ ﻭﺿﻌﺖ ﺍﻟﺒﻼﺩ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻕ ﺍﻻﻭﺳﻂ ﻭﺷﻤﺎﻝ ﺍﻓﺮﻳﻘﻴﺎ ﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬ 
ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﻗﻮﺍﻧﲔ ﺣﻮﻛﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺧﻄﻄﻬﻢ, ﻭﻫﺪﻓﻬﻢ ﻫﻮ ﺧﻠﻖ 
ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩ ﺍﻓﻀﻞ ﻭﻻﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ ﻣﻨﺎﺥ ﺍﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎﺭ ﺍﻓﻀﻞ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﻳﲔ ﺍﳌﺤﺘﻤﻠﲔ 
ﻓﻲ ﺍﳌﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ.
ﲢﺎﻭﻝ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺪﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﺍﻥ ﺗﻌﻄﻰ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺭﺉ ﻧﻈﺮﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﺣﻮﻛﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ 
ﺍﻟﻴﻮﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻼﺩ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻕ ﺍﻻﻭﺳﻂ ﻭﺷﻤﺎﻝ ﺍﻓﺮﻳﻘﻴﺎ.
ﻭﻟﻘﺪ ﺑﻨﻴﺖ ﺍﻟﺪﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﺳﺘﻘﻼﻉ ﻧﻔﺬ ﺑﻮﺍﺳﻄﺔ ʻﻣﻌﻬﺪ ﺣﻮﻛﻤﺔ ﳊﻮﻛﻤﺔ 
ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕʻ ﻓﻲ ﺩﺑﻲ, ﻭﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻳﺮﻛﺰ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻠﻖ ﻗﻮﺍﻧﲔ ﺟﻴﺪﺓ ﳊﻮﻛﻤﺔ 
ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ.
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1. Introduction
1.1. What is corporate governance?
In today´s business world we find many different definitions for the term 
corporate governance. The two most named and used ones  in literature 
describe the term in a very detailed, and brief way. The first definition 
comes from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and is defined in the following way:
„Corporate governance is the system by which business  corporations are 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies  the 
distribution of rights and responsiblities among different participants  in the 
corporation, such as, the boards, managers, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures  for making 
decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure 
through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance.“1 The seond one is shorter 
and is briefly compared to the first one. 
„Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance 
to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment.“2  As we can see from these two definitions, corporate 
„Good Corporate Governance is Good Business.“
3
1 OECD Principles of corporate governance (2004): http://www.oecd.org (November 2008)
2 Shleifer and Vishny (1996), p. 737
governance can be seen as a set of processes, customs, policies and 
laws which determine how a corporation is directed and controlled. 
Furthermore, it describes the relationships among all the stakeholders of a 
corporation. The principal stakeholders  include the shareholders, 
management and the board of directors. Among the other stakeholders we 
can find e.g. employees, suppliers, customers, community, banks, 
environment; in brief: anyone who is dealing with the corporation.
A company which is dedicated to good corporate governance has well-
defined and protected rights for their shareholders, a stable control 
environment, high transparency and disclosure as well as an empowered 
board. The company´s and the shareholder´s interests  are perfectly 
aligned.
The following table gives the reader an overview of the five elements of a 
good corporate governance (Figure 1).
Source: Hawkamah Institute (2008), A Corporoate Governance Survey, p.11
Figure 1: Five elements of good corporate govnernance
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The elements in this table however do not necessarily represent 
everybody´s opinion on corporate governance in business today. It is  more 
than just sticking to some guidelines or rules. First of all we might ask 
ourselves „why is  there a corporate problem anyway?“ Why does Adam 
Smith´s  invisible hand not create a proper solution to this problem? Should 
not be the market in charge of allocating resources in an efficient and 
appropriate manner? 
Luigi Zingales  (1998) defines a corporate governance system as „a 
complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the 
quasi-rents generated in the course of a relationship.“ 3  He refers to the 
initial contract as incomplete which means that not all possible occur or 
situations could possibly happen or result from certain actions from the 
parties and thus can not be covered in the contract because it would be 
either too costly or simply impossible. The result is  that there is some 
room for bargaining. One has to distinct between decisions which have 
been made ex-ante (before the two parties entered a contract) and ex-post 
(when the quasi-rents will be divided). Zingales explains  this by means of 
a machine example. Consider the purchase of a customized machine. 
Before the production starts, the producer and the buyer agree on certain 
agreements like final price etc. However, signing this contract does not 
end the relationship between the two groups. While producing, several 
incidents may happen which can change the price and costs of the 
production process. The relationship between the producer and the buyer 
represents a bilateral monopoly as they signed the specific contract. For 
the buyer, this machine probably has a higher value than on the market. 
The producer, however, has presumably the lowest cost to produce the 
machine. This difference between the two parties (what they generate 
together and what they could get from the market) describes a quasi-rent, 
which needs to be divided ex-post.4  A quasi-rent can be viewed as the 
5
3 Zingales (1998), Corporate Governance, p. 3
4 Zingales (1998), Corporate Governance, p. 2
difference between the earnings from an investment and the earnings from 
the next best investment possibility.
Recalling this example of the machine, the bargaining outcome will also be 
affected by other factors as first stated in the initial contract. For example, 
who is the owner of the machine while it is being produced? Is  it costly for 
the buyer or the producer to delay the final shipment? Furthermore, an 
important role is  played by the institutional environment: is the ability of the 
producer for producing this good known by future clients? All this  makes 
up a governance system.
Zingales states two necessary conditions for the existence of a 
governance  problem. The first one is that the relationship between buyer 
and producer has to create quasi-rents. If there were not any quasi-rents, 
there would not be any room for bargaining. The second requirement 
which has to be fulfilled is that these quasi-rents are not perfectly allocated 
ex-ante. There would not be any bargaining in case they were. Several 
governance mechanisms like the capital structure, allocation of ownership, 
takeovers, boards of directors etc. can be seen as  processes where such 
quasi-rents are generated and distributed. Governance is not necessary in 
a world where future incidents or events  can costlessly be put into a 
contract           ex-ante.
This  approach of incomplete contracts is  a good example to describe the 
corporate governance of entrepreneurs. The allocation of ownership  and 
the way of how the capital structure is chosen can be described through 
this  approach. We find several efficiencies of such a governance system 
ex-ante as well as ex-post. The incentive to establish relationships with 
certain investment opportunities can be counted as an ex-ante advantage. 
Changing the conditions, which create some room for bargaining, can be 
seen as advantages for the second group.
It can be concluded that there still has to be done a lot of research and 
investigations on this  topic, namely how such corporate governance 
mechanisms interact with each other or how takeovers  affect the resulting 
quasi-rents.
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1.2. Who benefits from good corporate governance?
Considering the two main definitions of corporate governance, the 
question arises who is interested in a good corporate governance or rather 
a good governed company? It seems rather logical that possible investors, 
who are interested to invest in a company, will choose firms which are 
stable and have a strong economic growth in order to get a return from 
their investments. A well-defined corporate governance code is desirable 
to all the stakeholders for very similar reasons. 
• Investors are interested in companies with a good corporate 
governance since those firms exhibit a lower risk at expropriation. 
Well-governed companies can protect their shareholder´s  rights 
better and also offer a better assurance that the management of the 
firm is  acting in the very interest of the company and all of its 
shareholders. Furthermore, well-governed companies outperform 
their competitors with respect to financial and operational 
performance and also provide a better long-term return on 
investment.5
• As the risks which are associated with the corporation decline with a 
better corporate governance, companies benefit. There are two 
reasons for that. First, the probability of„rent-seeking“6  by managers 
is  reduced. Second, good corporate governance reduces the cost of 
capital and consequently increases  the firm value. The lower risk 
results from improved processes inside the corporation due to a 
better coordination of information and a improved decision-making 
process. This leads to a better performance.
• The public sector also benefits  from corporate governance as it 
eases the development of stronger markets, lowers risk, and 
7
5 Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003): p.738
6 In economics, rent-seeking refers to managers that seek gains by manipulating the 
environment rather than through productive behaviour.
improves a country´s ability to deal with investments  - which helps to 
advance economic growth.
• All other stakeholders like banks, suppliers and employees profit from 
the better performance of the firm. 
During the last years many researchers started to create indices for 
measuring the quality of corporate governance practices. These indices 
are then put in relation to the performance of the companies. Several 
commercial providers are now offering such services like corporate 
governance research and corporate governance ratings as the awareness 
on this topic increased due to the demand of institutional investors. In 
Europe, Déminor is providing investors  with information like disclosure, 
board structure, governance practices of the Financial Times Stock 
Exchange (FTSE) Eurotop 300 index companies.7 
Such providers also exist for other markets. Standard and Poor 
established such services for emerging markets, and Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia (CLSA) released corporate governance ratings for more 
than 490 companies in 25 countries. The results from a study which was 
carried out by CLSA in 2001 found a strong correlation between corporate 
governance and financial performance ratios.8
According to another survey from McKinsey9  the premium investors would 
pay for a well-governed firm varies  by country and region. The premiums 
in the MENA countries range from 29% (Egypt) to 30% (Morocco). 
Compared to those countries, the premiums in Europe are slightly lower 
(e.g. Germany 20%). There exist plenty of reasons why corporate 
governance has become such a relevant issue during the last two 
decades. First of all, we can notice a world-wide wave of privatization in 
8
7 See http://www.deminor.com/ for more information (March 2009)
8 Further information can be found on the website http://www.clsa.com (March 209)
9 McKinsey´s Global Investor Opinion Survey (2002): http://www.mckinsey.com (November 
2008)
the economy. Regarding this matter, one has to think about how the newly 
privatized companies  should be controlled and owned. That´s when 
corporate governance principles are inevitable. More and more 
households are saving money in order to invest it in equity. This  had the 
consequence that a service industry came into existence that creates 
voting recommendations and exercises votes for the clients.10
Events such as the big financial crises in the past years  or the collapse of 
big international companies like Enron in the US or Parmalat in Italy - due 
to  corruption or deceptive practices - can shake the economies of 
countries to a huge degree. Fighting corruption needs constant efforts. 
Therefore it is very important to have proper solutions to fight such 
problems; through improving transparency and disclosure, accountability, 
and a good corporate governance. Good corporate governance is 
fundamental in guaranteeing a stable and well-growing economy. Schleifer 
and Vishny give a good explanation why corporate governance is 
important for the business and society: „Understanding corporate 
governance not only enlightens the discussion of perhaps marginal 
improvements in rich economies, but can also stimulate major institutional 
changes in places where they need to be made.“11
9
10 Becht, Bolton, Roell (2002), p. 4
11 Shleifer and Vishny (1996), p. 738
2. MENA countries and their recent development
The term MENA stands for „Middle East North Africa“ and is  often used in 
business writing. They represent an economically diverse group which 
includes states with a common culture and heritage. The MENA countries 
can be subdivided into 3 different groups. Countries which belong to the 
first group are called „Early Reformers“, because they are following 
economic reform programs since the 1980s. Countries like Egypt, Jordan 
and Morocco belong to this group.
The second group contains mainly oil-exporting countries like Bahrain, 
Kuwait,  United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Due to the still rising oil 
price those countries achieved economic stability. Since 2000 they have 
also allowed foreign investments in their home market.
The last group contains all other countries  whose economy is  unstable 
due to political reasons  (West Bank, Gaza, Iraq) or still in early 
development (Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, Libya). Security markets still do not 
exist or are of a very small size.12
Generally, it can be noticed that the financial sector in those countries 
primarily is a bank-based sector with still growing securities  markets. 
10
12 Corporate governance in Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan (2003), p. 10
Stock exchanges are either controlled and supervised by government or 
by a securities regulator, as in Egypt and Oman.13 As for 2007, the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) amounts to about 1,52% of the world´s GDP. 
Market capitalization of all listed companies in the MENA region increased 
from about 20% in 2002 to more than 58% in 2007 (% of GDP).14  For 
further details see the table below.
2005 2006 2007
GDP World $ 45.053.892.754.518 $ 48.626.696.268.075 $ 54.347.037.614.014
GDP MENA $ 614.210.445.076 $ 706.222.965.961 $ 828.691.246.709
GDP MENA % World 1,36% 1,45% 1,52%
Market capitalization 
of listed         
companies (% of 
GDP)
48% 48% 58%
Population (MENA) 302.718.938 308.110.570 313.432.951
Many countries in the MENA region announced their commitment to 
introduce corporate governance to strengthen their market economy and 
to encourage further private investments in the future. The issue that a 
good corporate governance is essential for firms to sustain a stable and 
efficient growth will be discussed in a later chapter.
Figure 2: Overview GDP and market capitalization
Source: http://econ.worldbank.org (March 2009)
11
13 Corporate governance in Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan (2003), p. 11
14 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), Online Database 
    http://econ.worldbank.org (December 2008)
2.1. Corporate governance in the MENA countries - an 
overview
Most of the countries in the MENA region are in transition and on the way 
to market-based governance. Economic reforms have been undertaken in 
Egypt, Morocca and Jordan in the 1990‘s to move closer to a market 
economy model.15  About 10 years ago, the concept of corporate 
governance was unknown in most of the  countries in the MENA region. 
Due to the domestic war in Lebanon, the implementation of corporate 
governace in this country has not shown any progress for about 20 years. 
However, a big economic reform program started in the last years and 
focuses on the corporate sector.
Looking at the companies  and corporations  in these countries, it can be 
noticed that many large companies are often controlled by „family groups“ 
or individuals. They have at least one shareholder who owns more than 
20% of the shares.
This  fact can be considered as a major problem for the introduction of 
corporate governance principles because managers do not have the 
autonomy, flexibility and objectivity for monitoring all the processes inside 
the company and to follow its objectives. Moreover, many companies in 
the MENA region are privatized and state-owned. For example, in Egypt 
the state holds more than 20% of shares in the 20 biggest companies, and 
more than 50% in another 12 big companies listed on the exchange.16
The basis for every corporate governance framework is  taken from the 
company, civil and securities laws. Also the listing rules from the stock 
exchange regulations and the basic accounting standards are fundamental 
for the board and the management. Basically the corporate governance 
framework for those countries in the MENA region refer to two laws: the 
Corporate Law and the Capital or Securities Market Law.17 One main aim 
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of these mentioned laws is the improvement and enforcement of 
disclosure requirements.
In order to rise the awareness of the importance of corporate governance, 
many conferences and workshops have been held by many institutions in 
the Arab countries. So far these events made the implementation of 
corporate governance rules more attractive for the management of firms. 
2.2. Hawkamah Institute for Corporate Governance in 
Arab countries
The international association Hawkamah Institute for corporate 
governance (Hawkamah)18  - with its  headquarters in Dubai - is an 
institution with the mission to promote good corporate governance in the 
Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia region, as well as assisting the 
countries in developing and implementing such sound and well-integrated 
codes adapted to the countries‘ needs and objectives. Hawkamah 
provides its  services to all kinds of enterprises; namely from listed 
companies to banks, financial institutions, non-listed companies including 
family-owned enterprises as well as the public sector with a focus on 
state-owned enterprises. 
The Hawkamah Institute works together with many other prominent 
institutions such as the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Dubai School of 
Government (DSG). Furthermore, Hawkamah is also fostering 
communication and policy dialogue both at regional as well as 
international level, either through seminars, workshops or conferences. 
The Executive Director of Hawkamah is  Dr. Nasser Saidi who is the former 
Minister of Economy and Trade and Minister of Industry in Lebanon. His 
aim is to back the establishment of the institute and to develop sound 
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financial markets  to improve the future economies for the Golf 
Coorperation Council (GCC) and the MENA region.
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3. Implementing corporate governance:      
practice vs. theory
3.1. The survey
The Hawkamah Institute for corporate governance has carried out a 
survey in collaboration with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) on 
corporate governance of listed companies and banks across the Middle 
East and North Africa. The aim of the survey was to get more detailed 
information on the role of corporate governance in today´s companies. In 
detail, the survey contained 57 non-listed banks, 65 listed banks and 922 
listed companies from 11 MENA countries and so had the total number of 
1044. Jordan was the country with the most participants in this survey 
(219 in total), Lebanon the one with the fewest (9 in total). Due to another 
survey which had been done by the Internation Finance Corporation (IFC), 
lebanese banks were not included in the survey of the Hawkamah 
institute.19 Banks were divided into four different groups according to their 
amount of assets. Listed companies were also grouped - along sales - into 
four categories.
A detailed chart of all the countries which have been considered in the 
survey can be found at the end of the paper (chart 1).
Despite of the high number of questioned firms, only 155 companies did 
respond (74 banks, 81 listed companies). The countries which were finally 
included in the survey are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and West 
Bank & Gaza.
The major aim of this survey was to find out how important corporate 
governance is  for these companies or rather how their current state 
according corporate governance is.20  Furthermore, this survey should 
allow stakeholders to get an insight into the company´s implementation of 
their corporate governance principles.
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The following discussion is based on this survey and tries  to give the 
reader an overview on today´s  development and state of corporate 
governance in the Middle East and North Africa region.
3.2. General findings
As mentioned before, good corporate governance codes are essential for 
a good working and stable firm performance. It is important that the 
interests of the stakeholders  and the management are perfectly aligned to 
keep everyone happy.
The majority of the survey´s respondents also see the implementation of 
corporate governance codes as important for their corporations (around 
40%).21  The results show that there is  no big difference between listed 
companies and banks.
However, not all participants in this  survey were able to give the correct 
definition of the term corporate governance consistent with common 
approaches - namely „a system by which business corporations are 
directed and controlled“. Many of the respondents mixed up the term 
corporate governance with the term corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
or corporate management. A fact that shows clearly that corporate 
governance is still not fully understood by many firms.
CSR tries to describe how companies  set their business processes in 
order to achieve a positive impact on society.22 It is about the commitment 
of a firm to behave ethically to improve the workers´ life and the society in 
general. On the other hand, corporate management deals with the 
monitoring and controlling of a firm´s performance using indicators such as 
revenues, Return on Investment (ROI) and other financial ratios.23 These 
explanations show that both CRS and corporate management are both 
two distinct concepts  which have to be considered separately from 
corporate governance.
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In more detail it can be claimed that the majority of respondents  combines 
good corporate governance with a better compliance with legal and 
regulatory requirements. In addition to that, a general improvement of 
operational efficiency and a mitigation of risk are assumed to be benefits 
of well-established corporate governance. Only a very small fraction of the 
firms and banks cited a lower cost of debt and equity. Looking at the 
survey, which has  been undertaken with the top 1.000 listed UK firms, the 
three benefits, which have been mentioned the most among the 
participants, are protecting shareholder rights  (95%), improving access to 
external capital (88%) and lowering cost of debt and equity (85%). Only 
around 1% sees the compliance with regulations as a benefit resulting 
from corporate governance.24 
It is  crucial for directors and managers  of firms to fully comprehend the 
benefits of good corporate governance codes in theory and also in 
practice.
3.3. Still at the beginning
The countries in the MENA region are still at the beginning of this 
implementation phase. Their aim for the upcoming years should be to 
commit to corporate governance, to build up a robust control environment, 
to strengthen transparency and disclosure and to have protecting 
shareholder rights. The Hawkamah Institute - together with the IFC - 
created certain corporate governance indicators which should help to 
present or describe the current state of the companies´ codes. There 
exists  a total amount of 32 indicators, grouped into five categories starting 
from ‚demonstrating commitment‘, ‚implementing good board practices‘, 
‚building a robust control environment‘, ‚strengthening transparency and 
disclosure‘ and last but not least ‚protecting shareholders´ rights‘. 
The fact that the majority of the companies and banks are still at the 
beginning of the introduction phase of corporate governance principles 
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can be verified by the number of indicators  they applied. 51% of all firms 
implemented 15 or less indicators  and can therefore be put into the 
„emerging practice“ section. Around 41% of all firms followed up to 23 
indicators (‚improved practice‘). However, not a single company or bank 
out of the sample of 152 firms did follow all 32 indicators.25
Banks face special governance problems due to their more diverse and 
inscrutable activities. Therefore those processes are more difficult to 
control and monitor. This can be seen as a reason why banks are usually 
committed to better corporate governance practices compared to listed 
companies. Transparency and disclosure are very important because of 
the fact that banks  are often highly regulated. A proof for this can also be 
found in the survey of Hawkamah where the pillar representing 
transpareny and disclosure is scoring more than 70% and therefore 
outperforms the other four pillars by far.
The graph on the following page shows how many of the participating 
firms implemented each of the five pillars of corporate governance (Figure 
3). Transparency and disclosure seem to be the most important pillar. We 
can also notice a trend between banks and listed companies.
Figure 3: Implementing corporate governance principles in the MENA region
Source: Hawkamah (2008), Corporate Governance Survey, p. 18
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Both banks and listed companies show similarities  in implementing 
corporate governance principles. As  mentioned before, due to the strict 
regulations and laws which are binding for banks, they generally show a 
stronger commitment to a good implementation of such governance 
guidelines.
3.4. Board of Directors
The board of directors in a company represents the shareholders  and can 
therefore be seen as an important control mechanism for corporate 
governance. It is the place in the company where the key corporate 
governance issues come together. It normally consists of persons, who got 
elected, and the board´s major task is to monitor and to control the 
company´s activities. The question whether the board´s members are 
independent or not is relevant for good corporate governance. 
The main responsibilities of the board lie in 
•    guiding and monitoring management;
•  ensuring good corporate governance rules;
•  setting a company strategy;
•  selecting and replacing the Chief Executive Officer (CEO);
•  setting up a succession policy;
•  implementing good board practices;
•  improving transparency and disclosure;
•     approving annual budgets
•  protecting the shareholders´ rights, just to mention the main 
tasks.
Depending on the legal framework which it operates in, the tasks of the 
board normally vary from country to country and from organisation to 
organisation. As the markets globalize and become more complex, the 
demands of the boards tend to increase. Directors  have to handle a larger 
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amount of issues in a more efficient way in order to stay competitive. 
Setting up a company strategy is  the task of the board in the majority of 
the surveyed companies  in the MENA region. Only 25% of the banks and 
listed companies assign this task to the CEO.26
The development of such company strategies is  quite a difficult, time-
intensive and complex task which is usually be done by the managers 
because they are the ones who have a better understanding for the 
industry and the resources. The directors, however, are better in reviewing 
and finally approving such strategies. 
3.4.1. Board Structure
Basically, we can distinguish between two different board systems.27  The 
most common one is the so called one-tier board which has both 
executive and non-executive members. On the other side, the monitoring 
and control activities of the two-tier board - which is predominant in 
Germany - are split up into two boards: the management board (Vorstand) 
and the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). This, however, is only the case 
for stock operations. Other types of companies (e.g. the limited liability 
company GmbH) can freely choose between the one-tier or two-tier board.
In the MENA countries the one-tier board is the dominating model, except 
for Morocco which has a board structure similar to Germany. This  structure 
is  best practice in the case when the position of CEO and chairman are 
held by the same person. We have seen which problems can arise in 
recent international corporate crises. However, this  separation of chairman 
and CEO can be difficult to realise in the MENA region due to the fact that 
the majority of companies are family-owned.28  This  separation is not an 
easy thing in a family-dominated business. It would not be easy to remove 
an owner of a family-owned company to let others  work with his  invested 
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money. In Lebanon this  split is prohibited by law (Lebanon Code of 
Commerce). It states that the chairman shall also fulfill the responsibilities 
and tasks of the general manager unless he selects one to act in his 
interests.29 In Oman the Code of corporate governance strictly forbids the 
combination of the role of CEO and general manager.30
The benefits of having a board of directors which consists of a balanced 
mix of executive, non-executive and independent directors are quite 
intuitive. An executive director or inside director is an employee of the 
company and is often holding the position of CEO and CFO. They are best 
informed of what is going on in the company and what the firm is 
struggling with since they face those problems every day. Non-executive 
directors or outside directors do not hold any position in the firm. They 
may or may not be independent. The advantage of having such directors 
on boards is that they have an outside perspective and useful contacts. 
They do not have any business tie to the firm aside from their directorship. 
That is  when a director is called independent. Independent directors are 
said to exercise for the benefit of the company and in the interest of all 
shareholders. There is  no personal interest in the decision-making 
progress. However, being only independent does not help. Independence 
may also mean indifference and having less information than inside 
directors.
Boards in the MENA region seem to have a well-balanced mix of 
executive, non-executive and independent directors. It is  blazing that 
companies in the Mashrek region (Morocco, Tunisia) are dominated by 
executives, while boards in other regions have more non-executive 
directors (Gulf region). We also find evidence in the literature that a poor 
performance of a company leads  to a higher number of outside directors 
(reverse causality).31  One reason for this phenomena could be that 
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managers of poorly performing firms try to bring new „views“ into the 
company that may have a positive effect on the success. Not only skills 
and knowledge in finance and accounting is a necessity for directors, also 
knowing what is happening in the industry and outside the company is 
relevant for developing and setting up strategies for the firm´s future. 
3.4.2. Board size
The right size of the board is also essential because a too low or a too 
high number of members can lead to a slower decision-making progress. 
A small board might have a lack of experienced members, whereas a big 
board is difficult to manage. Finding the right board size therefore is  not an 
easy task to fulfill. Empirical studies  point out that a larger board size is 
negatively correlated to firm performance in general. A possible 
explanation could be again the coordination problem or the problem of 
free-riders.32
According to the survey of the Hawkamah Institute, the majority of the 
surveyed banks and companies has around two to five non-executive 
(23%) and executive directors (42%). Having a look on the independence 
of directors, we see that 55% of all banks and companies have either one 
or no independent director on the board.33
As mentioned before having independent directors on the board can have 
some positive side-effects for the performance of a company. However, it 
does not solve all the problems within a board. Factors like experience 
and expertise, loyality and integrity are just as inevitable to have a good-
working and qualified board. Researches on this  topic also showed that a 
company with more outside directors is less sensitive to takeovers as they 
do a better job than inside directors. Therefore the better performance of 
the firm leads to a decreasing likelihood of being taken over by another 
firm.34
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Having a look on the board size of various  companies in the gulf region 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) we 
can notice rather big differences in the board size.35  While the average 
board size in Bahrain and Qatar is  around 8.5 members, we only have 
around 6.2 members in Kuwait and 6.7 in Dubai. Possible explanations for 
this  obseravation have to do with the legal framework of these countries. 
The law in Abu Dhabi for instance says that a board has to consist of at 
least 3 members  and allows a maximum size of 15. In Kuwait, however, 
the only requirement is that it has a minimum size of 3 members. Sectors 
like the banking sector, telecommunications and energy sector have the 
largest boards with a mean of 8.5 members, on the contrary the financial 
service sector only has boards with about 6 members. Taking the size of a 
company into consideration, data clearly show the bigger the firm the 
bigger its  board. However, this relation is  not linear as some very large 
companies like Etisalat36 would have unrealistic and huge boards. 
3.4.3. Establishing board committees
Because of the increased complexity of the board´s tasks it is useful to 
create certain committees which take over some of the board´s 
responsibilities. In this way experts and professionals are allowed to focus 
on certain issues to finally recommend them to the board. Therefore the 
board is discharged from the responsibilities and can pay more attention 
on fulfilling their main duties.
A board can have many different committees. Companies tend to 
implement three committees for the purpose of good corporate 
governance - namely the audit, nomination and remuneration committee. It 
is  desirable that each of these committees is governed by independent 
directors or that they have at least one independent director. Although 
some of the original tasks have been delegated to other committees, the 
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unit which has the final decision power is still the board. It is  responsible 
for all board decisions.
The audit committee is charged with the role of monitoring the financial 
reporting and disclosure procedures. It should be composed of 
independent and outside directors but at least one of them has to be a 
financial expert. The nomination committee´s  main task is to recommend 
possible candidates for the election to the board of directors. Last but not 
least the remuneration committee which is  considered to determine and 
agree with the board of the remuneration of the CEO, chairman and other 
executive members.
In the Middle East and North Africa region a very large majority of firms 
and banks does have an audit committee (78%). However, the nomination 
and remuneration committee only exists in 28% of the surveyed banks and 
companies. Only 26% of the committees consist of a majority of 
independent members. There still has  to be some work done with 
reference to those committees so that all firms can benefit from their work. 
Having a look on the boards of the S&P 500 firms, we can see that all 
firms do have an audit and a remuneration committee and both consist of 
only independent directors. Almost all companies (98.5%) introduced a 
nomination committee and nearly all their members are independent.37
3.4.4. Board meetings
Board meetings  should be held at least four times a year. However, it is 
often the case that directors have to meet more often to discuss and 
decide on certain things. The number of board meetings per year varies 
from banks to listed companies. On the one hand, 46% of the surveyed 
banks stated that their board meets around three to five times a year, 
while the percentage rate for listed companies is nearly 60%. The diagram 
below shows the details.
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Figure 4: Board meeting frequency in the MENA region
Source: Hawkamah (2008), Corporate Governance Survey, p. 35
3.4.5. One director, one board? Multiple Directorships
It is not compulsory for a director to be a member of only one board. He or 
she can sit on two, three or even more boards at the same time. This 
cross-board representation is very common in the western countries as 
well as  in the MENA region. However, directors should not forget that 
quality and not quantity counts. There exist certain requirements for 
directors who wish to become a member of several boards. For instance 
the fact that he or she can not sit in a rival company. 
It is  quite interesting to see that the vast majority of directors in the GCC 
region are only members of one single board. Bahrain is the leader of the 
group with 89.9% and Qatar is  the last one with 78%.38 Private companies 
were excluded in this survey. The results would of course have been 
different if private companies had been included. It is difficult to aquire 
such information about private companies than it is for public ones. Around 
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12% of all directors in the gulf region are on two boards, only around 4% 
on three, and nearly 0% on four or more boards. 
Figure 5: Cross-board representation in the MENA region
3.5. Managerial Labor Market
The managerial labor market does have an influence on corporate 
governance. The question whether there is a connection between a firm´s 
performance and the turnover of the executive directors has been 
discussed by Gibson.39
Many researchers have found out that there exists a positive correlation 
between the CEO turnover and a poor firm performance.40  However, a 
poor performance is not the only reason for a high turnover. Other factors 
like pressure from outside shareholders must also be taken into 
consideration. As there are no surveys or researches on this topic for the 
MENA region, we presumably can take results from other emerging 
markets  (e.g. Asia) and draw conclusions  for the countries  in the Middle 
East and North African region.
Source: Hawkamah (2008), Power matters, p. 19
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A study from Gibson from the year 2002 showed that Chief Executive 
Officers from firms with a poor performance are more likely to get replaced 
than those in good performing companies. Gibson tested this for 
companies in emerging countries (Brazil, Chile, India, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Taiwan, and Thailand) over a period of 4 years.41
More generally said, CEO turnover is more sensitive to a firm´s 
performance when the board is dominated by outside directors. 
Furthermore, current studies found out that there is an even stronger 
relationship between the performance of a company and CEO turnover 
when the firm has a smaller board.42  If we also have a look on the 
executive compensation, Perry states that in case that the directors are 
paid by using incentives  (equity-based arrangements), the relationship 
between performance and turnover is even higher.43 
As stated before, there have not been carried out any surveys for the 
MENA region up to now. It is  questionable whether the results  from other 
studies can also be taken into consideration for the Middle East region due 
to the fact that many companies in the MENA area are dominated by 
families. The probability that a director will get repelled from his  own firm 
or company is quite unlikely. 
3.6. Executive Compensation
As mentioned before, only 25% of all surveyed banks and companies in 
the MENA region do have a remuneration committee which deals with 
setting up an appropriate remuneration package for the executive 
members of the company. It is  desirable that this package is aligned with 
the interests  of the firm and its  shareholders  - if possible in the long-run. In 
order to ensure that managers will create value for the shareholders, it is 
quite common for them to have incentive compensation packages - which 
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means that the salary is  typically splitted into a base salary, an annual 
bonus tied to the accounting performance and long-term incentive plans 
like stock options. There for sure exist additional fees which are paid out 
for additional responsibilities  like a committee membership, meeting fees 
or for being chairman of a board. Figure 6 on page 30 represents the 
board remuneration structure and practices of the surveyed banks and 
companies in the MENA region. It shows the percentage of executives and 
non-executives who receive such remuneration packages in detail.
The use of such remuneration packages is not common. Only 35% of 
executives do receive variable packages and more than 53% do not. It is 
quite interesting to see that stock options are only offered to 10% of the 
executives and less than 4% to non-executives. Stock options would be a 
good incentive for the long-run as they would tie the manager´s salary to 
the performance of the company. Looking at the pay mix of CEOs in the 
USA, we see that in 2004 more than 62% of the total salary consisted of 
long-term incentives (e.g. stock options) and only 15% contributed to the 
salary. Comparing the United States with the rest of the world, there is 
also a big difference between the breakdown of stock options and base 
salary. In the USA, nearly half of the total salary consists of long-term 
incentives, whereas in Europe or Asia they only represent a fraction of the 
total salary. 44 
The majority of the banks and companies in the surveyed region do not 
offer any insurance or pension funds which probably would bring 
executives and the company closer together as  they are considered to be 
long-term incentives. The question is  whether the remuneration committee 
or the board is responsible for setting the executives´  and non-executives´ 
salary. For approving the salaries of the executives, more than 80% of the 
banks and nearly 90% of the companies delegate this matter to the board. 
However, if stock options are also offered to the managers, it is 
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recommended that  the  company includes the shareholders in the 
decision-making process - in case shares get diluted. For approving the 
salaries of non-executives, on the other side, the majority of banks and 
companies assigns this task to the shareholders  (banks  63% and 
companies 69%).45  It would be better to delegate this matter to a 
remuneration committee which then decides on the salaries. This  policy 
could then be disclosed to the shareholders.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that such compensation contracts do not 
offer incentives for solving the agency-problem that comes up with the 
separation of ownership and control or management and finance in public 
companies.46 The reason for this is  that such incentive contracts motivate 
managers to act in their very own interest rather than the shareholders´ 
(problem of self-dealing). 
As mentioned in the first chapter, good corporate governance practices 
reduce the risk of rent-seeking by insiders. Managers could manipulate 
accounting numbers and investment policy to raise their salary. 
However, according to a study from Jensen and Murphy in 1990, an 
increase in the shareholders´ wealth by $1000 changes the salary of 
CEOs by only $2.59.47  This explains the argument of Shleifer and Vishny 
that such incentive contracts do not solve the agency problem at all.
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3.7. Risk Management
Several events like financial crises, business scandals or fraud took place 
in history and are still happening. Cases of accounting improprieties in 
several big firms like Enron, WorldCom or McKesson HBO were in the 
media and aroused the attention of investors. The reasons for the 
occurence of such crises are a weak control environment which assures 
that things like mismanagement, financial fraud or other abuses in a 
company are minimized. Referring to good governance practices, one of 
the board´s major duties should be to set up a policy which ensures that 
the management´s tasks and actions  are being controlled and overseen. 
The implemention of such a policy should pay attention to risk 
management, internal controls and the internal and external audit. As 
described in the chapter about establishing certain comittees in a 
company, the audit committee should be in charge of overseeing a firm´s 
control environment.
The advantages of having such a control mechanism for managing the risk 
of a company are obvious. Firms which are effective in risk-management 
are also more effective in the long-run - referring to profits. On the other 
side, those which do not pay much attention on risk may also not profit 
over the longer term. Companies which absolutely do not pursue risk 
management can be seen as lost - sooner rather than later.
Less than half of the surveyed banks and companies do have a risk 
manager or a department for risk management. In more detail, 62% of 
banks and only 23% of listed companies.48  The reason for this big gap 
between banks and companies  possibly results from the fact that banks 
are exposed to more risks and do have to follow more regulations 
regarding risk.
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3.7.1. Internal controls
Internal controls can be described as means by which the resources of a 
firm are monitored and directed. Furthermore it helps to detect and 
prevent fraud inside a company. Internal control can support the 
management to achieve all the objectives which have been set. The CEO 
should be responsible for designing and implementing such effective 
control mechanism. In the MENA countries, 59% of banks and only 36% of 
listed companies have an internal control - e.g. a control department. 
In 75% of those banks and companies, which do have such an internal 
control function, the board is responsible for this matter. Best practice sees 
the CEO in the implementing role, and the board in the monitoring role.
3.7.2. Internal audit
In order to improve a firm´s or bank´s operations and to increase the value 
in general, auditing is  inevitable. The internal audit process  can be seen 
as an assurance and consulting activity within the corporation that helps 
the organisation to focus on its goals by evaluating and monitoring risk 
management and the governance processes. It plays an immense 
important role in identifying possible risks that could harm the overall 
performance of the organisation. In the MENA region, the great majority of 
banks (85%) and listed companies (92%) do have such an internal audit 
function. Best practice calls the board to monitor and control the internal 
audit processes. 93% of banks and 76% of listed companies follow this 
best practice as they put the board in charge of this audit procedure.49
3.7.3. External audit
In addition to the internal audit, an external audit should also be conducted 
by an independent, professional auditor. An external audit shall provide an 
external view on the bank´s  or firm´s  situation regarding the financial 
statements and their fairly representation covering all aspects. 
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International standards require the external auditor to find out if the bank´s 
or firm´s financial statements  are in compliance with accouting principles 
or certain standards or which standards have not been taken into 
consideration while preparing the statements. A large majority of banks 
and listed companies in the Middle East and North Africa region - namely 
86.1% banks and 68.8% listed companies - employ international audit 
firms for overseeing and reviewing the financial papers. A rather small 
group of banks and companies relies on local audit firms (11.1% banks 
and 27.3% companies) and a very small percentage uses the services of 
individual auditors (2.8% and 3.9% respectively).50
Good corporate governance practices proved that it is necessary to 
change or rotate auditors from time to time to improve auditor 
independence. The reason for this is that there can be a problem if the 
auditor establishes a strong connection with the organisation he is 
reviewing. However, an argument against this issue is that it normally 
takes more than one year for an auditor to adapt to a new firm - so 
changing him or her every year would not be useful as he or she is 
unfamiliar with the business and may commit errors  during this  first period. 
In some business, a permanent auditor is also beneficial due to the low 
number of qualified audit firms. The surveyed banks and listed companies 
in the MENA region do not have a rotation-policy and therefore do not 
practice the auditor rotation. 59% of them stated that their external auditor 
has not been replaced during the last five years. 32% of banks and 
companies do have an effective audit-rotation policy. Among this 32% 
around 7% changed their last auditor due to his  or her poor auditing 
performance and 3% claimed they rotated the auditor because of cost 
considerations.51
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3.7.4. Audit committee
The audit committee is  providing help and support to the board in 
questions like establishing internal control mechanisms, audit policies, 
overseeing the relationship with external auditors and more. Some board 
of directors  also demand from the audit committee to set up risk 
management frameworks in cooperation with the board. Selecting the 
external auditors as well as choosing their fees is also one task of the 
audit committee.
3.8. Transparency & Disclosure
Recalling the Enron52 scandal from the year 2001, it was found out that the 
firm´s financial health was sustained by willful and creatively implemented 
accounting fraud. Enron created so-called offshore entities which were 
partly used to avoid taxes and to pretend the company was generating 
profits  while the firm was losing money. Resulting from this, the financial 
statements of the firm did not include any information about debts or 
losses. The price of Enron´s stocks dropped from $90 to just a few 
pennies over night. The scandal of Enron can be seen as the perfect 
example of how critical and important transparency is.
Financial transparency and disclosure are one of the most important and 
inevitable elements of a good corporate governance system. 
Shareholders, stakeholders and other participants in a market want to 
know what is going on inside the company. Those companies which do 
have a high level of transparency are also more highly rated and valued by 
investors. Firms, which neglect or fall short of this important point risk, 
damage the credibility of the management. Setting up transparency and 
disclosure guidelines or a policy is usually done by the board. 
Implementing, however, is  the work of the firm´s management. This best 
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practice is  realized by most of the banks and companies throughout the 
MENA region (80.6%).53
3.8.1. What is being disclosed?
The company´s corporate governance should make sure that all 
necessary information regarding the corporation are disclosed timely. 
Listed companies in the MENA region are required by law to publish its 
financial and non-financial situation on a regular basis. This can either be 
done quarterly, semi-annually or annually. 
Financial disclosure
The financial disclosure of a firm includes all the financial information that 
arise within the company. This covers the bank´s or company´s  balance 
sheet, income statement, cashflow statement, statement of equity and 
additional notes to the statements. There exist certain capital market 
regulations that enforce both banks and companies to adhere to. Non-
compliance with those requirements is sanctioned.
Most of the banks and companies in the MENA region publish their 
financial information through the local press (94.7%) and in the general 
assembly (93.4%). 88% of the surveyed banks and companies stated that 
they disclose it in the annual report and 85.9% use their website for 
publishing the relevant information.54
Non-financial disclosure
Non-financial information include everything from board composition, 
ownership and voting rights, general corporate governance information, 
operating results, company objectives, dividend policy, remuneration, 
other relevant policies etc. As the legal requirements for this  kind of 
information are insufficient in the region, we can see that the disclosure is 
weak among banks and companies. However, firms promise to send the 
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requested data upon request. Having a look on the following graphs we 
can see where banks  and companies disclose their relevant information in 
the MENA region.
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Figure 7: Which information is being disclosed?
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More and more banks and companies use the internet for publishing their 
financial and non-financial data. A slight difference between banks and 
companies is noticable - namely that banks use the internet more often for 
publishing their annual reports than do listed firms. Regarding non-
financial information, the extent to which they are disclosed is  rather weak 
compared with the financial information - for both banks and listed 
companies. Banks  seem to be more transparent than companies in 
publishing non-financial data.
It is not only important which data to disclose, but also how to publish 
them. Financial and non-financial data should be disclosed in compliance 
with certain quality standards  of disclosure. The most common standard in 
this  point is the so-called International Financial Reporting Standard 
(IFRS) which has the aim to improve the quality, transparency, reliability 
and comparability of such information and therefore to make financial 
information comparable to various countries. 59.6% of banks and 
companies in the Middle East and North African region stated that their 
disclosure policy follows the IFRS. The majority, however, discloses 
information along certain local standards, and only 4.6% report according 
to US GAAP. Nonetheless, many countries  in the MENA region still have 
not adopted the IFRS completely yet.55
3.8.2. Any barriers preventing disclosure?
There exist several reasons why firms and banks  do not fully implement or 
realize best practice regarding disclosure in the Middle East and North 
Africa region. For instance, one main reason for firms and banks not to 
adhere to several disclosure rules is that there is no legal requirement. 
76% of banks and 69% of firms state that this is  one explanation that 
prevents disclosure. Other possible reasons - also stated by the surveyed 
participants - are that there is  no demand to disclose all the necessary 
data (37% banks, 33% firms), no economic value for the bank or firm (34% 
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banks, 29% firms) or certain security issues (7% banks, 12% firms). Only 
4% of the firms see the lack of resources inside the company as means 
that prevent proper disclosure.56 
3.9. Shareholder rights
Shareholders represent the owners of a public corporation. It is in their 
interest that the management of the firm acts on behalf of them. They 
generally enjoy certain rights like
•  voting rights on corporation issues in the general assembly;
•  transfer shares;
•  receiving dividends as declared by the board;
•  having insight into the books and financial records;
•  sharing proceeds in case company got liquidated etc.
It is important that the interests of both the shareholders and the directors 
align and that the shareholders are treated equitable. However, this does 
not mean that each shareholder is  treated the same way. As there are 
larger and smaller shareholders, everyone has different interests in the 
company and may also have different goals. Nevertheless, the directors 
have to ensure that each shareholder is  treated fairly, namely with equal 
regard and respect.
As mentioned before, one right shareholders  enjoy is the right to 
participate in the general assembly of the corporation. They should be 
interested in what is going on in the company. The majority of banks and 
listed companies throughout the surveyed region confirmed high 
shareholder attendance rates (33% of all shareholders) during the last 
meetings.57
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As mentionend before, shareholders are the owners of a corporation. The 
more shares a shareholder possesses, the greater are his rights and the 
greater is his power inside the company. This implies  that small 
shareholders - so called minority shareholders - may have difficulties to 
exert their rights in their interests. They may see that the company is run 
in the interest of majority shareholders rather than by the minority. In a 
country where we find effective shareholder rights systems there is no 
chance for big shareholders to cheat on the small ones. However, there 
are some ways in which the majority shareholders  may favour themselves 
regarding certain topics in the company. For protecting the minority 
shareholder in the Middle East and North African region, we find two rights 
which are dominant. Firstly, the protection through pre-emptive rights and 
secondly, the use of tag-along rights. Through the practice of those two 
rights, shareholders are treated equally.
Whenever a corporation issues new shares, the use of pre-emptive rights 
allow a shareholder to maintain his or her proportion of ownership. If this 
had not been the case, the percentage of ownership would be diluted. 
Most of the corporation laws in the MENA countries do have such pre-
emptive rights.58  Furthermore, existing shareholders of a firm do have a 
higher priority when buying new shares than new shareholders.
The second type of rights  minority shareholders have are the so-called 
tag-along rights. They represent a contractual obligation for protecting the 
minority´s rights. Whenever a majority shareholder sells  his  or her stake of 
the company, then the minority shareholders also have the right to join 
them by selling their stakes  under the same conditions (e.g. at the same 
price). The figure below showes the percentage of banks and listed 
companies which do have such tag-along rights in use (Figure 8).
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Figure 8: The use of tag-along rights in the MENA region
Source: Hawkamah (2008), Corporate Governance Survey, p. 60
As we can see, around half of the banks protect their minority 
shareholders through tag-along rights, whereas only 31% of listed 
companies do have such rights.
In the chapter about disclosure and transparency the necessity of 
publishing relevant information about the company is described in detail. 
Concerning the rights of the shareholders, it is best practice to provide 
them all necessary information about the company at the right time. As the 
shareholders are participating in the general assembly, they should be 
informed in an adequate time prior to the assembly so that they have 
enough time to prepare for it. They should have time to read the agenda, 
to think about voting items, to make arrangements concerning the 
assembly and more. It is recommended to provide this information at least 
20 days before the general assembly. In the MENA region, banks follow 
this  best practice more than the listed companies. In detail, about 55% of 
banks provide all relevant information to the shareholders  at least 20 days 
prior the meeting, whereas only 22% of listed companies do so. The 
majority of listed companies distributes its information 15 days before the 
assembly (75%).59
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The majority of all surveyed banks and companies (80%) include all the 
necessary information for their general assembly to the shareholders; 
namely the agenda, time and place, the annual report, instructions for the 
proxy voting, report of the external auditor, financial statements and some 
additional information on the agenda.
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4. Family power in the MENA region
The economy in the MENA region - especially in the gulf region - is partly 
controlled by families. Many prominent families like the Qassimi and the 
Maktoums in the United Arab Emirates have family members60 sitting on 
the boards  of companies. The family concentration in the GCC region 
seems to be quite high. The numbers vary from country to country. There 
should be some limitations regarding the maximum board seats held by 
one family in a company. Most of the GCC regions do not have more than 
50% or 60% of the boards being occupied by the same family. For 
example the highest percentage of seats held by one family in Dubai is 
50%, in Abu Dhabi 66.7% and Saudi Arabia 75%. The only country which 
does not seem to pay attention to good governance practices regarding 
this  issue is Kuwait. Some companies in Kuwait do have boards where all 
seats  are held by one single family.61 In general, between 19% and 30% of 
board seats are occupied by family members in the GCC region. 
It is interesting to see to which extent families control companies. In 
regions like Dubai, Oman or Kuwait around 15% to 20% of the firms are 
controlled and influenced by the „Top 10 families“62 in this  area. In Qatar, 
the „Top 10 families“ controll nearly up to 50% of all firms. Surveys also 
show that prominent families which are usually thought of leading a 
country or emirate, seem to be absent in boards. The table (Figure 8) 
gives an overview of some prominent families  in the gulf region and the 
number of seats they occupy.
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62 weighted by market value of board seats
Region Family
Number of seats 
held by 
prominent family
% of all board 
seats
Abu Dhabi Nahyan 6 1,3%
Bahrain Khalifa 9 2,2%
Dubai Maktoum 4 1,5%
Kuwait Sabah 45 4,1%
Oman Bu‘ Saidi 15 1,5%
Qatar Thani 78 24,2%
Saudi Arabia Saud 5 0,6%
Source: Hawkamah (2008), Power matters, p. 23
Except of the Thani family in Qatar, all other families only hold a very little 
amount of the total seats in their region. Of the 38 listed companies in 
Qatar, the Thani family has a board seat on 29 firms. We can say that the 
Thani family is present in more than 76% of all firms in Qatar.
Another surprise is that the Qassimi family in the United Arab Emirates 
(which governs the smaller emirates Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah) nearly 
owns 8% of all board seats in the UAE - that is close to three times more 
than the Maktoums and Nahyan own together.
A study from Nowak, Erhart and Weber (2006) confirmed that family 
owned enterprises (FOE) outperform non-family business in terms of 
sales, profits and other measures.63 The reasons are a strong commitment 
to the business through the family members, trust and reliability among the 
members, passing the knowledge and experience from one generation to 
another.
Figure 8: Family overview GCC region
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However, many family business fail for several reasons during the third or 
fourth generation of ownership. Due to a probably poor management, 
insufficient cash, no adequate controlling and monitoring and other 
conditions it might be recommendable for FOE´s to think about a serious 
corporate governance. Referring to the Hawkamah Institute in Dubai, 
establishing a so-called family constitution is  a good way to improve a 
FOE´s business processes by setting the family´s core values, vision and 
goal of its  business. In addition to that, it should also be defined who is 
responsible for which task, compositions of boards, succession plans and 
a family member employment policy. In general, such a family constitution 
is  a good way to distinguish between the interests of the family and the 
company. In the MENA region, 50% of the listed companies stated that 
they have such a family constitution in use. On the other side, no bank has 
set up such a constitution. Banks usually have to follow strict  regulations 
regarding the ownership structures and therefore maybe would not benefit 
from such a policy.
The development of a family member employment policy should also not 
be thrown in the wind. The performance of a FOE can suffer essentially in 
case the company did not set up an employment policy which regulates 
how many family members the company should hire or how many 
employees are needed. A too large number of members  in the company 
can lead to a company´s downfall. Ensuring that every family member has 
a position within the firm is not desirable for a smooth working and efficient 
company. The majority of family-owned banks (67%) and family-owned 
companies (75%) stated in the survey that they have family employment 
policies for members who wish to apply for a position.64 
In many cases, the position of the CEO in banks and listed companies 
throughout the MENA region is held by a family member. More detailed 
results are represented in the following graph (Figure 9).
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Figure 9: CEO position held by family member?
Source: Hawkamah, Survey of Corporate Governance, p. 71
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5.Women on boards
The situation of women in the MENA region is not the same as in the 
western countries. The results of surveys  regarding the situation of women 
in the boards of companies in the Middle East and North African region are 
not surprising. However, it is interesting to see to which extent women are 
participating in the economy. According to the survey of the Hawkamah 
Institute, 63 board seats are held by women; that´s  1.5% of a total of 4,254 
seats. In America, the percentage of women represented in the boards is 
between 13% and 19% - depending on the business  sector.65  As the 
statistics only involve the gulf countries, it is interesting to see that Oman 
and Kuwait have the highest rates of women on boards (2.3% and 2.7%). 
It is not surprising that Saudi Arabia faces  the lowest rate with 0.1% 
female participation. In Europe, rates  also differ between the countries. 
Norway is the leader with 22% women on boards, Italy and Spain the 
laggards with just 3%.66
Reasons for the rather low representation of women in high positions can 
be found in the social and cultural structure of the countries. Those having 
a strong patriarchal society tend to have a low rate of women in the 
economy (e.g. Japan). Also the religious beliefs do have an influence on 
the female participation rates. This is an explanation for the low rates in 
Italy and Spain. Those countries  have a high concentration of Catholics 
(more than 95%) and therefore a low female rate compared to other 
European countries. Islamic countries show a similar result.
But it is not always  the social or cultural structure that explains the female 
representation in the economy. In Norway, for instance, the law states that 
at least 40% of the directors have to be occupied by women.
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However, we see that there are large discrepancies in the gulf countries. 
Participation rates go from 0.1% in Saudi Arabia to more than 2.7% in 
Kuwait; even higher than in some south-european countries. The key 
parameters explaining the differences in the various countries are social 
and religious factors. The graph gives  an overview over what has been 
said about the gulf region (Figure 10). The majority of the firms has no 
women on board.
Figure 10: Women on boards in the MENA region
Source: Hawkamah, Survey of Corporate Governance, p. 32
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6.Conclusion
The importance of good corporate governance practices and rules shows 
a steady increase during the last years due to business scandals, which 
occurred all over the world. Managers  and boards of companies have to 
be aware of the fact that such governance guidelines are inevitable for a 
stable and efficient growth and performance of a firm. It is not only the 
company itself which benefits from the implementation of sound 
governance codes, also possible investors  and the public sector are 
interested in their development, as well as other stakeholders of the firm 
like banks, suppliers and employees.
The basic intention behind this process in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) countries is to strengthen their market economy and to encourage 
further private investments in future by focusing on the implementation of 
corporate governance rules.
The results from a survey which has been carried out by the prominent 
Hawkamah Institute in Dubai proved that corporate governance codes are 
still not fully understood and developed by the managers in the Middle 
East and North Africa region. Banks and firms are still at the beginning of 
this complex implementation process. 
The fields  which are usually covered in the corporate governance 
practices range from the board of directors, shareholders´ rights and 
executive compensation over to financial disclosure and auditing. Factors 
like board composition, board size and board meetings all contribute to the 
performance of a company. 
Financial disclosure can be seen as one of the most important matter in 
this  corporate governance discussion. It is in the interest of investors, 
banks, suppliers and employees  to get access to relevant data like 
financial statements. As mentioned in the beginning, aligning the interests 
of the shareholders  and the management is one major task of corporate 
governance. Shareholders enjoy certain rights  like voting rights, receiving 
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dividends and having insight into the books and financial records. Minority 
shareholders should be protected by so-called tag-along rights  which are 
still not fully established in the Middle East and North Africa region. 
Looking at the economy in the gulf region, we notice that many board 
seats in companies and banks are occupied by prominent family 
members. Families like the Maktoums and the Qassimi in the United Arab 
Emirates have members sitting on the boards of big companies. However, 
we see that the number of seats being occupied by one family is rather 
small compared to the total number of board seats in this  area. A too high 
number of members of the same family clan can lead to a company´s 
downfall. It should not be the strategy of a firm to provide every family 
member a position within the company.
The situation of women in the MENA region is not the same as in the 
western countries. However, statistics show that some Arab countries  do 
have higher female participation rates on boards than some European 
countries. Saudi Arabia faces the lowest rate with only 0.1% female 
participation. Reasons for the rather low participation of women in high 
positions can be found in social and cultural structures of the countries. 
Also the religious beliefs do have an influence on the female participation 
rates. 
The results  which have been explained in this thesis vary from good 
developed corporate governance practices in some listed companies and 
banks to less developed ones in the surveyed area. It takes time to 
establish such a corporate governance framework in the Middle East and 
North Africa region as this is a very complex and sophisticated process.
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9. Charts
Chart 1: Distribution of banks and listed companies included in survey by
              country and total number of listed companies in MENA region67
Included in Survey
Non-
listed 
banks
Listed
banks
Listed
companies
Total Number of 
listed companies 
MENA region
Bahrain
Egypt
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Morocco
Oman
Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
UAE
WB & Gaza
1 6 41 56
21 17 125 448
13 2 204 253
1 6 164 207
0 0 9 30
5 0 52 80
1 5 139 160
2 9 71 128
5 9 35 67
5 7 57 131
3 4 25 37
Total 57 65 922
Total 1044 Total 1597
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67 Data taken from Worldbank http://econ.worldbank.org (March 2009)
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